中国经济管理大学 MBA课《Brand Management05》

徐老师

中国经济管理大学
《战略品牌管理》MBA导师手册（工商管理经典教材）
Chapter 5
Designing Marketing Programs to Build Brand Equity

Overview
This chapter explores the contribution of three of the four marketing Ps -- product, price and place – to customer-based brand equity.  The creation of equity effectively begins with the design of a product or service that satisfies consumer wants and needs. Perceived quality, which influences attitude and behavior, reflects consumer assessments of the relative superiority of a brand on dimensions related to performance, design, durability and other factors. Perceived value reflects consumer judgments about a brand’s price-quality relationship.
The chapter also discusses some of the new developments in personalized marketing. Experiential marketing, where the marketer focuses on connecting the consumer to the brand through a unique experience, is one emerging personalized marketing technique. Others include one-to-one marketing, where the marketer uses technologies such as the Internet to target individual consumers with individualized marketing messages; and permission marketing, where the marketer seeks permission in advance from consumers to send them appropriate, relevant marketing materials.  
Pricing strategy can affect consumer perceptions of a brand’s position in its product category and of its overall quality. Many firms now employ value pricing, in which a brand’s price is based on considerations of product quality, product costs, and product prices that satisfy consumer needs as well as the profit goals of the firm. Another popular strategy is everyday low pricing, which entails reducing or eliminating discounts and sales promotions in favor of an everyday fair price.
A brand’s distribution strategy also has an important influence on the creation of customer-based equity. Channels are of two broad types: direct, which involves selling to customers by mail, phone, the Internet, or personal visit, and indirect, which involves selling through intermediaries. The image a retailer has in the minds of consumers and the actions it takes with respect to stocking and selling products can affect the equity of the brands it sells. Therefore, it is in a firm’s interest to treat channel members as customers and assist in their selling efforts.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of private labels in Brand Focus 5.0, noting that they primarily threaten brands that are overpriced, under-supported, or undifferentiated. It is important not to confuse private labels with generic brands, because private labels identify the source of the product. The source is usually the chain in which the private label is sold, which is why private labels are also called “store brands.”  Major brands employ a number of strategies to fight private labels, from value pricing to continued product innovation.
Science of Branding
5-1: Making Sense out of Brand Scents
5-2: Understanding Consumer Price Perceptions
5-3: Eight Steps to Better Pricing
Branding Briefs
5-1: Marlboro’s Price Drop
5-2: Selling Luxury Goods at Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessey (LVMH)
5-3: Procter & Gamble Launches EDLP Value Pricing
5-4: Good Year’s Partnering Lessons
Additional Branding Briefs:
5-5: The Challenges of Launching a New Brand
5-6: Pricing Showdown in the Cereal Market
5-7: Expanding the E*Trade Brand

Discussion questions
1. Have you had any experience with a brand that has done a great job with relationship marketing, permission marketing, experiential marketing, or one-to-one marketing?  What did the company do?  Why was it effective?  Could others learn from that?

Answers will vary.
2. Think about the products you own. Assess their product design. Critique their "aftermarketing" efforts. Are you aware of all of the products' capabilities?  Identify a product for which you feel you are not fully capitalizing on all of its benefits. How might you suggest improvements?

Products common with students that have many capabilities and benefits as well as after-marketing efforts are likely to be technological items, such as computers, software, digital assistants, and cell phones. Other common categories include sport and recreation equipment, automobiles, and entertainment electronics.
3. Choose a product category. Profile all the brands in the category in terms of pricing strategies and perceived value. If possible, review the brands' pricing histories. Have these brands set and adjusted prices properly?  What would you do differently?

The cigarette industry is interesting for exploring pricing and pricing history. Major brands have altered pricing strategies over the years (can be tied in with Branding Brief 2-8: Marlboro’s Price Drop). Major brands also established flanker or “fighter” brands to protect their premium price. The premium national brands, such as Marlboro, Camel, and Winston, currently keep their prices constant relative to one another. The cereal category is another interesting category to investigate (can be tied in with Branding Brief 5-9 below: Pricing Showdown in the Cereal Market).
4. Take a trip to a department store. Evaluate the in-store marketing effort. Which categories or brands seem to be receiving the biggest in-store "push?"  What unique in-store merchandising efforts do you see?

Answers will vary.
5. Take a trip to a supermarket. Observe the extent of private-label brands. In which categories do you think private labels might be successful?  Why?
Supermarkets use private labels extensively for “commodity products” like milk, cheese, and condiments; for “me-too” products like cereals, snack foods, and soups; and a variety of other products. Private labels are more likely to be successful in low-involvement categories where they can compete primarily on price.  
Exercises and assignments
1. For each of the four Ps, have students identify an exemplar brand whose strategy is different from and superior to that of its competition. Discuss the role the particular strategy plays in the brand’s success. For example, Microsoft has an outstanding record of new product hits; WalMart’s pricing strategy is a major factor behind the retailer’s market domination; BP’s policy of not locating gas stations on corner properties gives it a distribution cost advantage over rivals; Snapple’s unique advertising quickly built national awareness and preference for what initially was a tiny, unknown brand.   
2. Ask students to survey consumers to identify product categories in which they engage in brand switching and determine what influences their behavior. Discuss the implications for marketing strategy of those influencing factors.
3. NASCAR teams – and the collateral merchandise and sponsorships that goes along with them – have been growing in popularity in recent years. Have students pick a NASCAR team and analyze the factors (team name, drivers, sponsors, licensing, promotions, etc.) that contribute to its brand equity.
4. Ask students to find a brand whose sole or primary distribution channel is the internet.  Discuss the likely reasons for the brand’s highly focused strategy and the positive and negative consequences of it.
Key take-away points
1. All of the four Ps – not just promotion – have important roles to play in the creation and maintenance of brand equity.
2. Personalized marketing is an emerging strategy to build brand awareness and brand loyalty.
3. The products and services that firms design are the cornerstones of customer-based brand equity.
4. Pricing strategy must be based on consumers and the competition, as well as cost and quality considerations.
5. Channel members should be thought of and treated as valuable customers whose image and actions can hurt or enhance brand equity.
Branding Brief 5-5
the challenges of launching a new brand

In 1996, Seagram Co. executives noticed a change in the vodka market.  The popular Absolut brand of vodka, which Seagram distributed, was being replaced on the top shelf of trendy restaurants and nightspots by upstart “superpremium” vodkas like Grey Goose, Ketel One, and Belvedere.  These superpremium vodkas came in tall, elegant cut-glass bottles and typically cost up to four dollars per glass more than Absolut.  Research indicated that some of Absolut’s core customers had switched to the premium brands. Seagram sought to counter this trend by developing a high-end vodka in partnership with Absolut named Sundsvall after the Swedish town where it was distilled.
Sundsvall was positioned as a “super-Absolut, whose pedigree would make up for its late arrival and obliterate the rival upstarts.”  Bottles of Sundsvall cost $30, twice as much as Absolut and more than four dollars more than Belvedere.  While the other bottles in the category were made from either cut or frosted glass, the Sundsvall bottle was designed with clear glass and an orange shrink-wrap top in order “to stand out from the crowd.”  In 1998, Absolut and Seagram launched the brand with a modest $2 million advertising budget.  The companies devised what they called a “discovery” strategy, where Sundsvall was initially marketed only in eight metropolitan test markets in order to build buzz.  In these markets, Sundsvall sponsored or hosted special events, such as invitation-only dinners at expensive restaurants where the brand was served exclusively.
When Sundsvall launched nationally, it garnered a lukewarm reception.  One problem: premium brands like Belvedere had already been on the market for three years.  Another problem was the packaging. Bartenders agreed that the product was high quality, but one bartender claimed the bottle “was too discreet for where it was competing.”  Compared with the competition, Sundsvall sold at a plodding pace.  For example, one Boston restaurant typically poured through two bottles a day of a competing brand, while a single bottle of Sundsvall might last three months there.  In 1999, Sundsvall sold 1,000 cases of product, compared with sales of more than 100,000 cases each for Belvedere and Grey Goose.
A little more than a year after the launch, Absolut stopped production of Sundsvall and ceased all marketing activities. For a company that achieved incredible success marketing its flagship product over the last two decades, the disappointing Sundsvall brand was considered a major failure.   

BRanding brief 5-6
pricing showdown in the cereal market

The cereal category experienced interesting price competition in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  During this time, the cereal industry as a whole aggressively raised prices on items as much as 5 to 6 percent every eight months.  In order to disguise the higher prices, cereal makers attempted to offset them with a host of coupons, trade promotions, and other deals (such as two-for-the-price-of-one and buy-one-get-one-free or “bogo” offers) – a strategy dubbed “price-up, deal back.”
On April 4, 1994 (“Cheerios Monday”), General Mills, the number two player in the $8.7 billion cereal market with a 29 percent share, announced that it would lower prices between 30 cents and 70 cents a box (or 11 percent on average) on its eight most popular ready-to-eat cereals (Cheerios, Honey Nut Cheerios, Multi Grain Cheerios, Wheaties, Whole Grain Total, Golden Grahams, Lucky Charms, and Trix).  General Mills also announced that it was cutting coupon and other promotional expenditures by $175 million.
General Mills was motivated by a number of factors.  With prices as much as 25 percent lower, private label cereals had begun to make some significant inroads on sales, increasing their share of the market to 5.2 percent.  Because of pervasive sales promotions, more than 60 percent of all cereal purchases were being made with some kind of coupon or discount. As Steve Sanger, president of General Mills, stated:
“The practice of pricing up and discounting back has become more and more and more inefficient for manufacturers and retailers and burdensome for consumers.  There’s tremendous cost associated with printing, distributing, handling, and redeeming coupons.  Because of this inefficiency, the 50 cents that the consumer saves by clipping a coupon can cost manufacturers as much as 75 cents. It just doesn’t make sense.”
Kellogg, the market leader with a 36 percent share, followed quickly with an announcement that it would stop offering the buy-one-get-one-free offers and attempted to hold firm on price increases by cutting costs.  Recognizing a competitive opportunity, marketers of the number three and four cereal suppliers, Post and Quaker Oats, initially decided to continue to offer $1-plus coupons.  Eventually, however, Post enacted a 20 percent across-the-board price cut and began to issue a new, all-purpose coupon that would apply to all sizes of all its cereals.  Kellogg soon thereafter reduced prices an average of 19 percent on nearly two-thirds of its line.
The cycle of price cuts perpetuated by the bitter price war was bad for the bottom line. Kellogg, as the leader, suffered significantly as a result of the price wars.  Kellogg’s profit margin shrunk, sales declined, and its market share plummeted.  In 1998, Kellogg raised cereal prices an average of 2.7 percent, its first increase since 1994.  This move signaled the end of the cereal price wars, but it did not solve Kellogg’s problems.  In 1999, General Mills grabbed the domestic market share lead from Kellogg’s.

Branding Brief 5-7
expanding the E*Trade brand

E*Trade was founded in 1991 and partnered with America Online and CompuServe in 1992 to offer trading to users of those portals.  In 1996, E*Trade established its own Internet site.  That year, E*Trade spent $25 million on its first national advertising television campaign, which attempted to convince viewers: “Someday, we’ll all invest this way” and aired on popular network programming.  Accompanying the television spots were two-page newspaper ads and Internet banners provocative lead-ins such as “Spank a Yuppie” and “Low Commissions.  Leave your kids more to fight over.”  
E*Trade hired Goodby, Silverstein & Partners in 1999 to develop more national advertising.  Goodby’s first campaign, titled “It’s time for E*Trade,” helped the company become one of the top four most recognized Internet brands in 1999 as ranked by Opinion Research Corp.  According to agency co-founder Rich Silverstein, “In four months, we built the brand.”  CEO Christos Cotsakos maintained that, “brand building was always first and foremost” among the company’s priorities.  
The company launched a major ad blitz for the 2000 Super Bowl by buying two spots during the pre-game show, another two spots during the game, and sponsoring the halftime show.  E*Trade “dominated the commercial showcase,” according to Brandweek.  The memorable “Monkey” ad was named as the fourth-best Super Bowl ad of all time by an online consumer vote.  As a result of its Super Bowl ad blitz, E*Trade enjoyed a 600 percent increase in new accounts in the quarter following the Super Bowl compared with the same period the previous year.  E*Trade maintained a consistent ad push following the Super Bowl, spending $522 million – or 38 percent of revenues – on marketing.
  
In 1999, E*Trade diversified beyond online trading with its $1.8 billion purchase of online banking firm Telebank, which it renamed E*Trade Bank.  E*Trade hopes to add other services to its site and become “a one-stop financial services supermarket.”  Additionally, E*Trade sought to expand beyond the Internet and establish a brick-and-mortar presence that would allow it to compete with traditional brokerage firms.  In August 2000, E*Trade opened the first of its brick-and-mortar locations, called “E*Trade Zones,” inside a SuperTarget store.  The E*Trade Zones feature customer service representatives and a full complement of services from trading to bank transactions.  
E*Trade also planned a network of 18,000 automated-teller machines in gas stations, drugstores, and supermarkets throughout 48 states, which the company upgraded to provide customers with access to brokerage accounts as well as bank accounts.  To add to its list of services, in 2000 E*Trade partnered with Ernst & Young to offer both on- and offline investment advice to clients.     
In 2000, E*Trade processed 150,000 transactions daily from its customer base of more than 3.6 million.  In 2001, E*Trade was the third largest online broker in terms of number of accounts.
中国经济管理大学
《战略品牌管理》MBA导师手册（工商管理经典教材）
第五章
设计营销方案，以建立品牌资产

概述
本章探讨了三四个营销诗的贡献 - 产品，价格和地点 - 以客户为基础的品牌权益。建立有效的股权开始与一个产品或服务，满足消费者需要和需求设计。感知的质量，影响态度和行为，体现在有关性能，设计，耐用性和其他因素方面消费者对一个品牌的相对优势进行评估。知觉价值反映关于一个品牌的价格，质量关系消费者的判断。
本章还讨论了个性化营销的一些新发展。体验营销，在营销上的连接通过一个独特的经验，消费者对品牌的重点，是一种新兴的个性化的营销技巧。其他包括一对一的市场，那里的营销用途，例如互联网的目标与个人消费者个性化的营销信息技术和许可营销，在营销人员从消费者要求提前送他们适当的相关宣传资料的权限。
定价策略可以影响一个品牌在其产品类别，其总体质量状况消费者认知。许多公司现在employ价值定价，其中一个品牌的价格是根据产品质量，产品成本和产品价格的考虑，满足消费者的需求以及与企业的利润目标。另一种流行的策略是天天低价，这意味着要减少或消除在日常公平的价格折扣和促销活动的青睐。
一个品牌的分销策略也对以客户为基础的股权创作的重要影响。渠道是两大类：直接的，这涉及到销售给客户的邮件，电话，互联网，或亲自拜访，间接，其中包括通过中介机构销售。零售商的形象在消费者的思想和行动，它与尊重需要有放养和销售产品可能会影响它销售的品牌权益。因此，它是在一个公司的利益当作客户渠道成员，并协助其销售的努力。
本章最后一私人标签在5.0品牌集中讨论，并指出，他们主要威胁是价格过高，在支持，或者未分化的品牌。重要的是不要混淆与一般品牌自有品牌，因为私人标签识别产品的来源。源通常是在其中自有品牌出售，这就是为什么连锁自有品牌也被称为“商店品牌。”主要品牌战略，聘请了打私的标签，从价值价格持续产品创新数目。
科学的品牌
5-1：制作香水的品牌意识了
5-2：了解消费者的价格感知
5-3：更优惠的价格八个步骤
品牌简介
5-1：万宝路的价格下降
5-2：销售路易威登酩悦轩尼诗（LVMH集团）奢侈品
5-3：宝洁公司推出EDLP价值定价
5-4：美好的一年的伙伴合作经验
其他品牌简介：
5-5：挑战的推出新品牌
5-6：在谷物市场价格摊牌
5-7：扩大了E *贸易品牌

讨论的问题
1。你有过任何一个已经做了与关系营销，许可营销，体验营销，或一对一对一营销非常出色的品牌体验？公司做什么了？为什么会有效？可以借鉴别人的？
答案会有不同。
2。想想你自己的产品。评估他们的产品设计。批判他们的“aftermarketing”的努力。是你的产品的能力都知道？确定一个产品，它，你认为自己没有充分了解其全部资本化的好处。你如何提出改进建议？
产品以学生，有许多功能和好处，以及售后服务的营销努力可能会科技项目，如计算机，软件，数字助理，手机，普通。其他常见的类别包括体育和娱乐设备，汽车和娱乐电子产品。
3。选择一个产品类别。个人档案中的所有的定价策略与知觉价值计算类品牌。如果可能的话，检讨品牌的定价历史。拥有这些品牌设定和调整价格是否正确？你会做什么不同？
卷烟业是探索历史的一些有趣的定价和定价。各大品牌都改变了多年来的定价策略（可以打上品牌简介2-8：万宝路的价格下降）。主要品牌还设立或侧卫“战斗机”品牌，以保护他们的保费价格。民族品牌的溢价，如万宝路，骆驼，和温斯顿，目前的价格保持不变相对彼此。谷物类是另一个有趣的分类调查（可连接5-9与品牌简介下面：在谷物市场价格争霸战）。
4。走一趟百货公司。评估在店内销售的努力。哪些类别或品牌似乎是最大的接受店“推？”有什么独特的店内销售的努力，你看到了吗？
答案会有不同。
5。走一趟超市之旅。观察自有品牌品牌延伸。在你认为哪些类别自有品牌可能会成功？为什么呢？
超市广泛使用的“商品产品”如牛奶，奶酪和调味品私人标签;为“我也是”像谷物，快餐食品，汤类产品，以及其他各种产品。自有品牌更可能是低参与类别在那里他们可以在价格上竞争主要是成功的。
练习和作业
1。对于每四个诗，让学生确定一个典范品牌的战略是完全不同或优于其竞争。论角色的特殊战略品牌的成功事例。例如，微软有一个新产品点击优秀记录;沃尔玛的定价策略是一个落后的零售商的支配市场的主要因素; BP公司不定位角点性质加油站政策可对竞争对手的分销成本优势; Snapple的独特的广告迅速建立国家意识和出于何种最初是一个很小的，不知名的品牌偏好。
2。要求学生调查消费者识别产品类别中，他们进行品牌转换，并确定哪些因素影响他们的行为。讨论营销策略的影响因素的影响。
3。纳斯卡队 - 和抵押商品和随之而来的赞助与他们 - 已经越来越流行在最近几年。让学生选择一个纳斯卡团队和分析的因素（团队名称，驱动程序，赞助商，特许经营，促销等），有助于其品牌资产。
4。要求学生找一个品牌，其唯一的或主要的销售渠道是互联网。讨论品牌的高度集中的战略，它的正面和负面的后果可能原因。
重点外卖点
1。不只是推广 - - 四诗都发挥重要作用，在建立和维护品牌权益。
2。个性化营销是一个新兴的战略，以建立品牌知名度和品牌的忠诚度。
3。其产品和服务，企业设计是基于顾客的品牌权益的重要基石。
4。定价策略必须基于消费者和竞争，以及成本和质量的考虑。
5。渠道成员应该被认为是和他的形象和行为会伤害或增强品牌资产有价值的客户处理。

品牌创建简介5-5
发起一个新品牌的挑战

1996年，施格兰公司高管发现，在伏特加市场的变化。在流行的Absolut伏特加酒品牌，施格兰分布，被取代的时尚餐厅和夜总会的最上一层的暴发户“superpremium”像灰鹅，Ketel之一，和丽城伏特加酒。这些superpremium伏特加来到高大，典雅的切割玻璃瓶和玻璃的成本通常高达四比绝对伏特加多美元。研究表明，绝对伏特加的核心部分客户已经切换到优质品牌。施格兰设法对付发展伙伴关系与绝对伏特加高端伏特加酒命名的小镇，它是瑞典松兹瓦尔蒸馏这一趋势。
松兹瓦尔定位为“超级绝对伏特加，其谱系将弥补其迟到和抹杀了对手的暴发户。”松兹瓦尔瓶的成本30元，绝对伏特加的两倍，超过四美元，比丽城多。而在其他类别的瓶，无论从减少或毛玻璃制成，松兹瓦尔瓶的设计采用透明玻璃和桔子拆封，以顶“脱颖而出脱颖而出。”在1998年推出的绝对伏特加和西格拉姆品牌与温和二百点〇万美元广告预算。设计出他们所谓的“发现”的策略，在最初销售松兹瓦尔在八个大城市测试市场不仅是为了建立动态更新的公司。在这些市场，松兹瓦尔赞助或主办的特别活动，如在那里的品牌被邀请担任独家昂贵的餐厅仅晚餐。
当松兹瓦尔全国推出，它囊括了冷淡的反映。一个问题：高级品牌如丽城已经在市场上三年。另一个问题是包装。调酒师一致认为该产品是高质量的，但一个酒保声称瓶“是过于谨慎的地方是竞争。”比起与竞争，在一个缓慢的步伐松兹瓦尔出售。例如，一个典型的波士顿餐厅通过两个瓶子倒了一个竞争品牌的一天，而一个松兹瓦尔单瓶有可能持续三个月。 1999年，1000松兹瓦尔出售产品的情况下，相对于每个案件超过10万丽城销售和灰鹅。
略高于一推出后一年多，绝对伏特加的松兹瓦尔停止生产和停止一切销售活动。对于一个公司，取得了过去二十年来令人难以置信的成功营销其主打产品，令人失望的松兹瓦尔品牌被认为是一个重大的失败。

品牌创建简介5-6
定价摊牌的谷物市场

谷物类经历了20世纪80年代末和90年代初有趣的价格竞争。在此期间，作为一个整体的谷物行业积极提出有关项目的价格高达5至6个百分点每八个月。为了掩饰价格上涨，谷物生产商试图抵消了优惠券，贸易促销收留他们，以及其他交易（如双换的价格，对一和买一送一免或“bogo”提供） - 策略称为“价格行动，对付回来。”
4月4日，1994（“麦片星期一”），通用磨坊，数两个八七零零零零零零零零美元谷物市场的球员有29百分之的份额，宣布将降低30美分和70美分框（或11个百分点的价格平均）就其八个最流行的准备食用的谷物（麦片，蜂蜜坚果麦片，谷物麦片，麦片，全麦总，金格雷厄姆，幸运的魅力，特丽克丝）。通用磨坊食品公司还宣布，这是削减1.75亿美元的优惠券和其他宣传支出。
通用磨坊是出于多种因素。由于价格高达百分之25为低，自有品牌，使谷物已经开始销售一些重大进展，增加其市场份额的百分之5.2。由于普遍销售的促销活动，超过60购买的所有谷物百分之正在与一些类型的优惠券或折扣。正如史蒂夫桑格，通用米尔斯先生表示：
他说：“打折后的价格和实践，已成为越来越多，效率越低的制造商和零售商，消费者的负担。有巨大的成本与印刷相关，分发，处理和赎回的优惠券。因为这种低效率的50美分，消费者节约了裁剪优惠券可以成本高达75美分的厂家。它只是没有意义。“
凯洛格，用百分之36的市场份额领先，紧随其后宣布，它很快将停止发售买一送一免费提供，并试图通过削减成本坚持涨价公司。认识到有竞争力的机会，在数三，四谷物供应商，邮政和桂格燕麦，营销人员最初决定继续提供1元多的优惠券。最后，然而，后制定了百分之二十全面的板降价，并开始发行一种新的，全功能券将适用于所有的各种规模的谷物。凯洛格此后不久就降价近两个三分一的路线平均百分之19。
由价格战的痛苦延续降价周期是坏的底线。凯洛格，作为领导者，遭受着作为价格战的结果。 Kellogg的利润缩水，销售额下降，其市场份额大幅下降。 1998年，凯洛格谷物价格提高了百分之2.7，其自1994年以来的首次增长的平均水平。此举标志着谷物价格战结束，但它并没有解决凯洛格的问题。 1999年，通用磨坊抓着凯洛格的国内市场占有率领先地位。


品牌创建简介5-7
膨胀的E *外贸品牌

é *贸易公司成立于1991年和1992年合作，提供交易，这些门户网站的用户提供美国在线和CompuServe。 1996年，电子交易建立了自己的因特网网站。这一年，电子交易花了第一次全国电视广告的广告，它试图说服观众2500万美元的：“有一天，我们都会这样的投资”，并在流行的网络编程播出。伴随着电视广告是两页报纸广告和互联网横幅挑衅铅，如“体罚雅皮士”和“低佣金插件。给孩子更多的战斗结束了。“
电子交易在1999年聘请Goodby，Silverstein的与合作伙伴开发更多的全国性广告。 Goodby的第一运动，题为“这对电子交易的时间，”帮助该公司成为四大之一，由民意研究公司评为1999年最知名的互联网品牌，据代理公司创始人富西尔弗斯坦，“在四个月内，我们建立的品牌。“行政总裁克里斯托Cotsakos认为，”品牌的建设总是首先在公司的优先事项“。
通过购买该公司推出在赛前显示了两个景点，在比赛中另外两个景点，并在中场休息时显示赞助的2000年超级杯广告的主要突击。 é *贸易“为主的商业橱窗”，根据Brandweek。令人难忘的“西游记”的广告被任命为第四最好超级碗广告的所有时间由一个网上消费者投票。由于它的超级杯广告突击的结果，电子交易中所享有的新帐户600个季度增长百分之以下超级碗比上年同期。 é *贸易保持了一贯的广告推动下超级碗，花费5.22亿美元 - 市场营销 - 或38收入的比例。
  
1999年，电子交易和网上交易的多元化超出其一十八万点〇〇万美元网上银行购买公司电讯理财，它改名为电子交易银行。 é *贸易希望添加其他服务，其网站上，成为“一站式金融服务超市。”此外，电子商务*贸易寻求扩大超出了互联网，建立一个砖和水泥的存在，使它与竞争传统的经纪公司。 2000年8月，电子交易打开了它的砖和水泥所谓的“E *贸易区，”里面一SuperTarget商店位置，第一。我的E *贸易区功能的客户服务代表和全面的服务补充从交易银行交易。
电子交易还计划在整个48个州，该公司升级为提供获得经纪账户以及银行账户的客户提供了18000自动算命先生在加油站，药店和超市机器的网络。为了增加其服务的清单于2000年，电子商务*贸易合作与安永会计师事务所同时提供在线和离线的投资建议给客户。
2000年，电子交易处理的交易从15万以上的每天360万的客户群。 2001年，电子交易是第三大的在线经纪账户数目计算。